A Micro-Payment Scheme Encouraging Collaboration in Multi-Hop Cellular Networks by Jakobsson, Markus et al.
A Micro-Payment Scheme Encouraging
Collaboration in Multi-Hop Cellular Networks
Markus Jakobsson1, Jean-Pierre Hubaux2, and Levente Buttya´n2
1 RSA Laboratories, Bedford, MA 01730, USA. URL: www.markus-jakobsson.com
2 Laboratory for Computer Communications and Applications, Swiss Federal
Institute of Technology, Lausanne, EPFL-IC-LCA, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland.
Jean-Pierre.Hubaux@epfl.ch, buttyan@acm.org
Abstract. We propose a micro-payment scheme for multi-hop cellular
networks that encourages collaboration in packet forwarding by letting
users beneﬁt from relaying others’ packets. At the same time as propos-
ing mechanisms for detecting and rewarding collaboration, we introduce
appropriate mechanisms for detecting and punishing various forms of
abuse. We show that the resulting scheme – which is exceptionally light-
weight – makes collaboration rational and cheating undesirable.
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1 Introduction
Multi-hop cellular networks rely on a set of base stations connected to a back-
bone network, as in conventional cellular networks (such as GSM), and on the
mechanisms of ad hoc networks [20], in which packets are relayed hop by hop
between peer wireless stations. The expected beneﬁts of such an approach with
respect to conventional cellular networks are multifold. First, the energy con-
sumption of the mobile devices can be reduced. Indeed, the energy consumption
required for radio transmission grows super-linearly1 with the distance at which
the signal can be received. Therefore, the battery life of wireless devices can be
substantially extended if packets are routed in small hops from the originator
to the base station. Second, as an immediate positive side-eﬀect of the reduced
transmission energy, interference is reduced. Third, if not too remote from each
1 Depending on the setting, the power decay is a function of the distance, ranging
typically from the square to the ﬁfth power [5]. The exact function depends on the
extent to which the signal is reﬂected oﬀ of buildings, on the nature of the material
to be traversed, on the possible interference from other electromagnetic sources, etc.
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other, mobile devices can communicate independently from the infrastructure.
Fourth, the number of ﬁxed antennas can be reduced; and ﬁfth and ﬁnally, the
coverage of the network can be increased using such an approach. However,
while all participating wireless devices stand to beneﬁt from such a scheme, a
cheater could beneﬁt even more – by requesting others to forward his packets,
but avoiding to transmit others’ packets.
Micro-payments are potential tools for fostering collaboration among selﬁsh
(rational) participants, and may be used to encourage collaborative routing of
data and voice packets. However, while conceptually well suited to such a task,
all proposed micro-payment schemes cannot be applied as such to the problem
we consider here. One reason is that it is unlikely for a packet originator to know
who – or even how many parties – are on the route of the packet. In contrast,
traditional micro-payment schemes assume that the payer knows (at the very
least) how many payments he is performing at any one time, but typically also
whom he is paying – whether by identity, pseudonym or address. If the payer
does not know whom he is paying, he could either attach several payment tokens
(without any designated payee), or attach one token that can be deposited by
several to him unknown parties. Either way there is a potential for abuse, and to
avoid this, one needs to generate suﬃcient audit information to trace users who
deposit more tokens than is appropriate. Previously proposed micro-payment
schemes do not generate such audit trails.
To make things worse, we must not only consider the possible actions of
individual cheaters, but also collusions of these. Here, a dishonest set of parties
may do anything from routing a packet in a circular manner to claiming rewards
for (or collecting payments on behalf of) parties not actually involved in the
routing. A possible approach is to assume some degree of tamperproofness (as in
[4]). While it can be argued that [4] and other related approaches rely on a similar
form of tamperproofness as is successfully provided by GSM SIM cards [21, 16],
we mean that the latter provides “portability of identity” rather than security.
This is because the SIM cards merely contain identifying information, and not
accounting information, and an attacker cannot defraud others (whether other
users or the operators) by modifying the functionality of his module. A better
comparison in terms of adversarial setting may therefore be that of access to
satellite entertainment. There, users may defraud the system (and routinely do)
by using rogue modules. While satellite entertainment companies surely would
prefer not having to rely on tamperproofness to assure correct behavior, they do
not seem to have much choice. In contrast, and as we show, we do not have to
rely on any form of tamperproofness to curb cheating – a careful protocol design
suﬃces for the setting we consider.
Finally, we must consider the communication overhead (and the degree of
interaction) necessitated by any solution, and make sure that this overhead is
acceptable, even for the routing of single packets. This requirement is not nor-
mally placed on micro-payment schemes, where the primary constraint is often
considered the computational requirement for performing – and receiving – a
payment. We place emphasis both on the communication costs and the com-
putation costs, noting that both of them translate into battery consumption.
Keeping this low by means of collaborative routing, of course, is the motivating
force of this work, and the execution of our protocol must not depart from these
goals.
Components and contributions. We avoid the use of all cryptographically
heavy-weight operations, and make use of simple symmetric building blocks to
achieve our goals. Thus, our contributions are not in the development of new
cryptographic techniques, but rather, in addressing an important problem us-
ing the simplest possible building blocks. We propose an architecture that is
suitable for the model, and put forward four diﬀerent mechanisms that together
constitute our protocol.
The first component is a technique for users to determine to whom a packet
should be routed. Here, we allow each mobile device to have a preset threshold
(potentially depending on its remaining battery life) corresponding to the size
of the reward (or payment) they require to transport packets. Likewise, packet
originators associate reward levels with packets according to the importance of
having them transported. It must not be possible for cheaters to modify these
reward levels, of course.
A second component is a technique allowing base stations to verify that
all packets were accompanied by a valid payment, and drop those that were
not. Given that we assume rational (as opposed to malicious) behavior of all
participants, this rules out a denial of service attack in which a party causes
transport of packets that will later be dropped by the base station due to their
invalid payment ﬁelds. We argue that this is not a practical limitation, given that
an attacker cannot completely drain anybody’s batteries (even if constantly in
their presence) since each mobile device has a threshold determining when they
will collaborate. Moreover, there are easier ways of mounting denial of service
attacks, such as simply jamming the communication channel.
A third component is a technique for aggregation of payments. Similar to the
recent proposal by Micali and Rivest [17], this works by a probabilistic selection
of payment tokens. As in [17], we allow this aggregation to be performed by the
mobile devices (payees), for whom storage is a scarce resource. We also consider
aggregation of payment information by the base stations as an additional cost-
saving measure. To increase the granularity of payments, a user with a “winning
ticket” would report the identities of his neighbors (along the packet’s path)
when ﬁling a payment claim. Thus, not only the claimant is given a reward for
transporting the packet, but his neighbors, too. While this allows for a reduction
in storage requirements, its main use is within the fourth component:
The fourth component is an auditing process that allows the detection of
cheating behavior. This is in the same spirit as the detection of reuse of sequence
numbers in [17], but speciﬁc to our setting. In particular, our auditing techniques
detect and trace dropping of packets, collusions of users ﬁling payment claims,
and attacks in which users give priority to the routing of packets carrying winning
tickets. Our audit process takes advantage of already collected information from
an array of diﬀerent sources. First, it uses payment claims (winning tickets) from
users. As mentioned above, these contain the identities of claimants’ neighbors
(along the packet’s path). Second, it uses packet transmission information from
base stations. Third, it makes use of geographical location information collected
by base stations – this is information about what users are in what cells at what
time, and is already collected for other purposes.
Together, these mechanisms address the problem of how to foster collabora-
tion among rational but selﬁsh nodes2 in a multi-hop cellular network. The two
main contributions of our paper are the development of a suitable model and
architecture; and an audit process suitable for detecting all important attacks
without the need for the collection or maintenance of substantial amounts of
data.
Outline. We begin by describing our technique at a very high level, and de-
scribe related work (section 2). We then turn to detailing our model and goals
(section 3). Then, we describe our proposed protocol (section 4) and proposed
accounting and auditing techniques (section 5).
2 Overview and Related Work
Multi-hop cellular networks. Although attractive at ﬁrst sight, multi-hop cellu-
lar networks raise a number of problems. For example, in conventional cellular
networks, base stations usually are in charge of channel allocation and of the
synchronization and power control of mobile devices; to accomplish this task,
they take advantage of their direct communication link with each and every
mobile device currently visiting their cell. It is quite diﬃcult to extend these
operating principles to multi-hop cellular networks. A similar observation can
be made in the framework of wireless LANs; for example, in an IEEE 802.11
network, a station can work either in infrastructure mode (namely, with one or
several access points), or in ad hoc mode, but not in both.
Over the last years, several researchers have started to bring initial responses
to the technical challenges of cellular multi-hop networks. The Soprano project
[25] advocates self-organization of the physical, link and network layers. An
analysis of the improvement of the throughput is provided in [12], while a routing
protocol aiming at providing appropriate QoS is described in [13]. Connectivity
of such networks is studied in [6] by means of percolation theory. The use of
multi-hop networks is also envisioned in the third generation of cellular networks,
where they are called “Opportunity Driven Multiple Access” (ODMA) [8].
Stimulating cooperation in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. Several researchers have
explored the problem of fostering cooperation (especially for packet forwarding)
in mobile ad hoc networks. In [15] the authors consider the case in which some
malicious nodes agree to forward packets but fail to do so. In order to cope with
this problem, they propose two mechanisms: a watchdog, in charge of identifying
the misbehaving nodes, and a pathrater, in charge of deﬁning the best route
2 In this paper, “node” and “mobile device” are synonymous.
circumventing these nodes. Unfortunately, this scheme has the drawback that it
does not discourage misbehavior.
Another proposal [3] leverages on the reputation of a given user, based on
the level of cooperation he has exhibited so far. In this scheme, users can re-
taliate against a selﬁsh user by deying him service. It is important to note that
this proposal is not restricted to packet forwarding but can encompass other
mechanisms of the network. A drawback of this type of solution is that a set of
colluding cheaters can give each other large quantities of positive feedback, while
giving anybody critizing a member of the collusion negative feeback – both as a
deterrrent and as a way to reduce the credibility of the feedback the honest user
gave.
An even more recent contribution, called Sprite [27], takes a similar approach
to what we do in our paper in that it considers an ad hoc network and assumes the
presence of a backbone. On the other hand, it does not address the case of multi-
hop cellular communications. While the contributions of Sprite are very nice in
that they avoid assumptions on tamperproofness while still proving security
statements for a stated model, there are potential drawbacks of their solution in
terms of its overhead, security, and topology requirements. In particular, their
scheme requires a fair amount of computation and storage, making it vulnerable
to DoS attacks. Namely, Sprite requires the veriﬁcation and storage of an RSA
signature (or similar) for each packet. In contrast, we use faster veriﬁcation
functions (such as determining the Hamming distance between two strings) and
only store veriﬁcation strings for a fraction of all packets. Moreover, they do
not consider attacks involving manipulation of routing tables, while we provide
heuristic and statistic techniques to address this problem. Finally, they base
their scheme on a reputation mechanism that will only be meaningful in rather
dense networks. It is not clear that a typical network exhibits this property.
Among the related work, the already mentioned paper [4] is probably the
closest to the present proposal in terms of the problems addressed and the main
principles behind the solutions. While the trust model and the protocols of [4] are
diﬀerent from those we propose in that we do not rely on tamperproof hardware,
the commonality is that of using micro-payments to foster collaboration in self-
organizing networks.
A more general treatment of how to stimulate collaboration can be found in
[18]. There, a theoretical framework for the design of algorithmic mechanisms is
provided. Although it was developed in a diﬀerent area, this approach could be
applied to our problem, by considering that each node is an agent and that it
has to accomplish speciﬁc tasks (such as packet forwarding).
Finally, for a general discussion of the security issues of mobile ad hoc net-
works and for a discussion on how key management can be made independent
of any central authority, we refer the reader to [9].
We will now discuss the way we envision the use of payments in a multi-hop
cellular network.
Our approach. Instead of using one payment token per payee (as is done in tra-
ditional micro-payment schemes [1, 7, 10, 11, 14, 17, 19, 22, 23]), we use one per
packet, letting all relaying nodes verify whether this token corresponds to a win-
ning ticket for them. To avoid forged deposits, the packet originator needs a se-
cret key to produce the token (not unlike other payment schemes.) To discourage
colluders from collecting payments for each other, we require the intermediary’s
secret key (the same as is used to requesting service) to be used to verify whether
a ticket wins. Thus, mutually suspicious colluders will not give each other their
secret keys, as this allows the others to request service billed to the key owner.
Therefore, we propose a system in which all packet originators attach a pay-
ment token to each packet, and all intermediaries on the packet’s path to a base
station verify whether this token corresponds to a winning ticket. Winning tick-
ets are reported to nearby base stations at regular intervals. The base stations,
therefore, receive both reward claims (which are forwarded to some accounting
center), and packets with payment tokens. After verifying the validity of the
payment tokens, base stations send the packets (now without their correspond-
ing payment tokens) to their desired destinations, over the backbone network.
The base stations also send the payment tokens (or some fraction of these, and
potentially in batches) to an accounting center. Packets with invalid tokens are
dropped, as the transmission of these cannot be charged to anybody.
However, and again in contrast to previous micro-payment proposals, inter-
mediaries are made to proﬁt not only from their own winning tickets, but also
from their neighbors’ – we require all reward claims to be accompanied by the
identities of the two neighboring parties on the packet’s path. This has three
direct beneﬁts: First, the “neighbor reward” encourages the transmission of the
packet, while the “personal reward” can be seen as a reward for receiving the
packet – and for reporting this to the clearing house. Second, it increases the
number of rewards per deposited ticket, which in turn means that fewer tickets
need be deposited. Third, and more importantly, it allows for the compilation of
packet forwarding statistics that can be used to detect inconsistent (read: cheat-
ing) behavior of intermediaries. By comparing the relative amounts of “neighbor
rewards” and “personal rewards” on a per-node basis, the accounting center can
detect various forms of abuse. In particular, this analysis will identify parties
that routinely drop packets, and parties that refuse to handle packets with-
out winning tickets. It will also detect various forms of collusion. As previously
mentioned, we discourage users from performing “collaborative ticket checking”
(when one party checks if a ticket is a winning ticket for one of his collabora-
tors) by requiring that they know each other’s keys for this to be possible. In
addition, our auditing techniques allow for detection of such behavior, thereby
providing two independent layers of protection. While the auditing techniques
only detect repeated misbehavior (as opposed to the very occasional abuse), this
is suﬃcient, as very few people are likely to alter their devices to make a few
cents a month. On the other hand, the more aggressively somebody abuses the
system, the faster they will be apprehended, and appropriately punished.
Relation to other payment schemes. Our aggregation principle is based on the
idea of probabilistic payments3, suggested by Rivest [22], and also related to work
by Wheeler [24]. Therein, each payment can be thought of as a lottery ticket.
Upon receiving it, the payee can determine whether it is a winning ticket or not,
allowing him to erase tickets that were not winning, and request payments from
the bank for those that were. While the bank only transfers funds for winning
tickets, these are correspondingly larger, thereby causing the appropriate amount
of funds to be transferred on average. In [22] and most other payment schemes
that have been proposed, the bank is transferring funds between payers and
payees in a “zero-sum” manner – meaning that for each payee that gets credited,
the corresponding charge will be (or have been) levied upon the payer.
If the crediting is probabilistic (as it often is in micro-payments), this may
mean that either payers or payees perceive a grand total charge (or credit) diﬀer-
ent than the number of payments suggests – at least for short periods of time. As
pointed out by Micali and Rivest [17], this may result in diﬃculties getting such
a scheme adopted by consumers. Accordingly, Micali and Rivest instead shift
the temporary ﬂuctuation to the bank, who debit and credit users according to
the number of payments made resp. received. In particular, a payer is charged
based on the number of payments he performs, while the payee is credited based
on whether a payment contains a winning ticket or not. Micali and Rivest let
each payment include a serial number that allows the bank to determine (from
the winning and therefore deposited tickets) how many payments a given payer
has performed. While it is possible for a payer to cheat the bank by performing
several payments using the same serial number, this cannot be done consistently
without the bank detecting it. This is so since the probability of one payment
containing a winning ticket does not depend on the probability of another one
containing a winning ticket – whether the payments use diﬀerent serial num-
bers (as they should) or the same. Thus, while the audit mechanism does not
necessarily detect a single instance of abuse, it will detect large-scale abuse.
Our proposal is somewhat similar to [17] in that payers (i.e., originators of
packets) are charged per packet, and not per winning ticket, while users per-
forming packet forwarding are paid per winning ticket. Therefore, the bank (or
accounting center) in our scheme plays the same “averaging role” as the bank in
[17]. The mechanisms for detecting abuse in our scheme are statistic, like those
in [17]. That is, while it is possible for a payer to cheat the “bank” once, it is not
possible in the long run. While there is only one payee per payer in traditional
payment schemes, each node on a route in our scheme may win on a ticket associ-
ated with one speciﬁc packet. The sender pays a cost that – on average – covers
the cost of routing, and of other network maintenance. The most straightfor-
ward approach of computing this charge is for the bank to compute the average
uplink4 cost (which depends on the reward level and the average number of
hops) and include this per-packet charge in the general charges for transmitting
3 In contrast, Jarecki and Odlyzko [10] perform probabilistic audits, while keeping the
payments deterministic.
4 The uplink is the link from the mobile device to the base station.
packets over the backbone. Such an approach is therefore a generalization of the
averaging techniques proposed in [17].
While payees (i.e., nodes) in our scheme are not paid for each packet they
handle, they are also not only paid corresponding to the winning tickets they
collect: they are also paid each time a neighbor (along the packet’s path) hands
in a winning ticket. This provides a step in the direction of crediting payees per
transaction by increasing the payment granularity, thus requiring fewer tickets to
be handed in. It also provides an incentive for users to propagate packets carrying
losing tickets (as they may be winning for the neighbor). Most importantly,
though, this strategy supplies the back-end with a rich source of data from
which it can detect protocol deviations.
As we have seen, payers are charged per packet, and not per winning ticket,
while users performing packet forwarding are paid per winning ticket. Such as-
symetric payment schemes often allow a coalition of malicious users to make a
net proﬁt. As we will see in Section 5, our protocol is immune against this kind
of abuse.
3 Model
User model. We assume the existence of three types of participants; users, base
stations, and one or more accounting center. In addition, there may be multiple
networks, each one of which is considered the home network for some users.
We distinguish between base stations of the home network, and those of other
networks, as will be explained below. We also assume that there is one accounting
center per network.
Mobile devices usually have very limited storage and power resources. The
base stations and the accounting center, on the other hand, correspond to pow-
erful computers that are connected to each other by means of a high-bitrate
backbone network.
Communication model. We assume the use of a network with a multiple-hop
uplink, and a one-hop downlink, noting that this choice minimizes the global
energy consumption of all mobile devices; we call a network of this kind “asym-
metric multi-hop cellular network”. In other words, as a packet travels from its
originator to the closest base station, it is transmitted in multiple short hops,
since this minimizes transmission costs. Here, the receiving base station may
belong to the home network of the user, or (if the user is roaming) to another
network, called the foreign network. Then, the packet is sent over the backbone
from the base station receiving the packet, to the base station closest to the
message recipient. (If the packet is multicast, there may be several such base
stations, and corresponding receivers.) The closest base station, in turn, trans-
mits it directly (i.e., in one hop) to the recipients – this does not require any
involvement (or energy consumption) by any of the mobile devices in range. Note
that the energy expenditures of the receiver are independent of the distance of
the transmission: it is only the sender whose energy consumption depends on
this distance. This model is therefore diﬀerent from the commonly used symmet-
ric communication model in which cell phones and base stations communicate
without intermediaries (i.e., where both uplink and downlink are one-hop).
This model is also diﬀerent from the one usually considered for multi-hop
cellular networks. Indeed, in the proposals published so far, both the uplink and
the downlink connections are multi-hop. These properties are strongly inﬂuenced
by the traditional approach of cellular networks (e.g., GSM) and wireless LANs
(e.g., IEEE 802.11), in which all links are assumed to be bidirectional. This
bidirectionality is considered to be very important, notably for radio resource
allocation, power control, and synchronization.
The reason why we depart from this assumption is that a single-hop downlink
can be highly beneﬁcial. Indeed, as there is no need to relay downlink signals,
the transmission power for the downlink is provided exclusively by the base
station, sparing the batteries of the nodes which otherwise would have had to
relay the packet. Moreover, this direct channel can be exploited to transmit
synchronization signals from the base station to all mobile devices present in
the cell. Finally, it makes the allocation of the radio resource on the downlink
easier to implement. To the best of our knowledge, asymmetric multi-hop cellular
networks have never been proposed in the literature; the study of their feasibility
and of their potential merits and shortcomings is well beyond the ambitions of
this paper.
Functional model. Users can be categorized as belonging to one or more of
the following classes: originators; recipients; and intermediaries. An originator
of a packet wishes to have this sent to one or more recipients of his choice.
Intermediaries may act as routers, forwarding such packets towards the closest
base station. Each such packet then gets transmitted through the backbone
network to the base station(s) corresponding to the recipient(s); here they get
broadcast by the base station in question and received by the desired recipient.
Note again that a packet is only handled by intermediaries on its way to a base
station, and not from a base station on its way to its recipient.
Trust model. Although in reality, very few consumers would attempt to modify
the functionality of their devices, it is suﬃcient that a small fraction would
abuse the protocol in order for its commercial usefulness to be endangered.
Reﬂecting this, we make the pessimistic assumption that the devices can be
straightforwardly modiﬁed by their owners, corresponding to modelling the user
as a software module run on a multi-purpose computer, with an appropriate
communication module. Users are not trusted to act according to the protocol,
but rather, may deviate from this in any arbitrary way. However, it is assumed
that the users act rationally, i.e., that they only deviate from the protocol when
they can beneﬁt from doing so. In particular, users could collude in an arbitrary
fashion, and could use a strategy that is a function of data they receive by
means of the network. Users trust base stations of their home network not to
disclose their secret keys; no such trust has to be placed in base stations outside
their home network. All base stations are trusted to correctly transmit packets,
and to forward billing and auditing information to the accounting center of
the user’s home network, according to the protocol. The accounting center, in
turn, is trusted to correctly perform billing and auditing. These are reasonable
assumptions for a network that is well guarded against compromise; it is also a
reasonable assumption in a network constituting of a small number of principals
that audit each other’s activities, both by cryptographic/statistical means, and
by traditional means.
Goals. The end goal of our protocol is to maximize battery life by minimizing the
required transmission signal strength of mobile devices, with the added beneﬁt of
increasing the available bandwidth by reducing signal strength. In order to reach
this goal, given the selﬁsh nature of users, we propose a set of mechanisms for
encouraging collaboration and detecting (and punishing) cheating. In particular,
these mechanisms are designed to address several types of abuse, as described
hereafter.
Abuse. A na¨ıve solution to the problem may simply provide users with a strategy
that maximizes the common good by requiring individual users to collaborate
by forwarding other users’ packets. However, users – being selﬁsh – may deviate
from this proposed protocol. In order to reward altruism, our protocol aims to
detect collaboration, allowing this to be rewarded – whether in monetary terms
or in terms of improved service levels. Furthermore, our protocol has mechanisms
for detection of various forms of cheating. In particular, we prevent or detect the
following types of abuse, whether these strategies are used in a “pure-bred” form,
or in combination with each other:
– Selective acceptance. A cheating strategy in which a user agrees to receive
(with the intent to re-transmit) packets with winning tickets, but not packets
without winning tickets. (A variation of the attack is when a ﬁrst user sends
a packet to a friend to route, given that the packet is likely to contain a
winning ticket for the friend.)
– Packet dropping. When a user agrees to receive packets, but does not
re-transmit them – whether he claims credit for winning tickets or not.
– Ticket sniﬃng. When a user claims credit for packets he intercepted, but
neither agreed to re-transmit nor actually re-transmitted. In a severe version
of this attach, colluding users along a fake path submit claims as if they
routed the packet.
– Crediting a friend. When a user with a winning ticket claims to have
received the packet from (or have sent it to) a party diﬀerent from that
which he in actuality did receive it from (resp. sent it to.)
– Greedy ticket collection. This is a collection of cheating strategies aimed
towards allowing users to claim credits in excess of what the protocol spec-
iﬁes, by collecting and sharing tickets with colluders. Three special cases of
this general attack are (1) when one user collects tickets for a friend, know-
ing that these are likely to be winning tickets for the friend; (2) when sets
of users collect and pool tickets, allowing each other to sift through a larger
pool than they routed; and (3) when a user obtains two or more identities,
evaluating tickets with all of these to increase the chances of winning.
– Tampering with claims. An attack in which a cheater modiﬁes or drops
the reward claim ﬁled by somebody else – when routed via the cheater –
with the goal of either increasing his proﬁts or removing harmful auditing
information.
– Reward level tampering. An attack in which a packet carries an “exag-
gerated” reward level promise during some portion of its route, but where
the reward level indicator is reduced before it is transmitted to the base
station.
Note, however, that a plain refusal to collaborate is not abuse, as long as the
refusal is independent of whether a packet carries a winning ticket or not. Users
may choose not to route other users’ packets if their resources or policies do not
permit them to do so.
Moreover, note that we do not address “circular routing” as a possible at-
tack, given that the rewards will be deterministic given a particular ticket, and
therefore, such routing does not behoove an attacker. Neither do we consider
the milder form of abuse where a set of users route a message along an unneces-
sarily long path within a particular neighborhood, in order to allow all of them
to (justiﬁably) claim credit for having handled the packet – this assumption is
reasonable if there is enough “real traﬃc” to route, and the reward structure is
set appropriately.
4 Protocol
Setup. As a user u registers to be allowed access to the home network, he is
assigned an identity idu and a symmetric key Ku. This pair is stored by the user
and by the user’s home network. As is common, users oﬀer their service provider
some form of security, normally implemented by means of a contract or deposit.
Rewards. Originators may indicate one of several reward levels; the ultimate
(billing) cost for these levels will be speciﬁed by his service agreement. The re-
ward level L is an integer within a pre-speciﬁed interval [0 . . .maxL]. Intermedi-
aries are rewarded accordingly: if transmitting a packet associated with a higher
reward level, their expected reward will be greater (with reimbursement levels
speciﬁed by their service contract). Increasing the reward level allows users with
particularly low battery resources to obtain service in a neighborhood populated
by other users with low battery resources.
Connectivity graph. We assume that each user u keeps a list5 λu of triples
(ui, di, Li), where ui is the (unique) identity of a neighbor with a path of length
5 We do not address how the routing table is built, noting that any standard method,
whether proactive or reactive, may be employed. In addition to standard information,
the users also exchange information about their reward thresholds Li.
di hops to the closest base station. Furthermore, Li is user ui’s corresponding
threshold for forwarding packets. (Thus, an entry (ui, di, Li) in λu means that
user ui will forward all packets whose reward level is equal to or greater than
Li, and that the length of the path from ui to the base station is di.) We assume
that λu is sorted in terms of increasing values of di, and that all entries with the
same distance di sorted in terms of increasing values of Li.
Packet origination. The originator uo of a packet p selects a reward level L ∈
[0 . . .maxL], and computes a MAC µ = MACKuo (p, L). He then assembles the
tuple (L, p, uo, µ) and transmits this according to the transmission protocol be-
low.
Packet transmission. Let u be a user (whether originator or intermediary) who
wishes to transmit a packet associated with a tuple P = (L, p, uo, µ). In order
to transmit P , user u performs the following protocol:
1. If the base station can be reached in a single hop, then u is allowed to send
the packet directly to it; otherwise he goes to step 2.
2. u selects the ﬁrst (hitherto unselected) entry (ui, di, Li) from λu for which
Li ≤ L.
3. u sends a forward request to ui. This contains the reward level L and possibly
further information about the packet p, such as its size6.
4. u waits for an acknowledgement from ui for some pre-set time period δ. If
u receives the acknowledgement, then he sends P to ui. Otherwise, if no
acknowledgement arrives, he increases i by one. If i > |λu| then he drops the
packet; otherwise, he goes to step 2.
5. If u is not the originator of the packet, he performs the reward recording
protocol below.
Packet acceptance. Let u′ be a user receiving a forward request from u with
reward level L. If L is less than his threshold, then he does not accept the
request; otherwise, he accepts it by sending an acknowledgement to u and awaits
the transmission of the packet.
Network processing. When a packet P = (L, p, uo, µ) is received by a base station
in the originator’s home network, the base station looks up the secret key Kuo
of the originator uo, and veriﬁes that µ = MACKuo (p, L), dropping the packet
if this does not hold.
If the packet is received by a base station that belongs to a foreign network,
this base station cannot perform the veriﬁcation (as it does not have access to
the originator’s secret key), and so, forwards the packet P to a register in the
originator’s home network. This register, then, looks up the originator’s secret
key, performs the veriﬁcation, and drops the packet if the veriﬁcation fails7.
6 Most protocols support several packet sizes.
7 Similarly to the technique adopted in most 2G and 3G cellular networks, the detour
of each and every packet via the home network can be avoided, by letting the foreign
network perform the described veriﬁcations; this can be done without revealing the
secret key to the foreign network.
If the veriﬁcation of the MAC succeeds, the base station (resp. home network
register) transmits the packet portion p to the base station associated8 with the
desired recipient (as indicated in p). The base station associated with the desired
recipient broadcasts p to the latter.
The ﬁrst base station records a fraction µ of all triples (µ,L, u), where u is
the identity of the user it received the packet from. It also keeps a count cntuo of
the number of packets it transmits for uo. Periodically, base stations send such
recorded auditing information to an accounting center, along with geographical
information consisting of statistics of what users were in what cell at what time
(not all such information is sent, but some portion.)
Reward recording. After user u has forwarded a tuple P = (L, p, uo, µ), he veriﬁes
whether f(µ,Ku) = 1 for some function f (the choice of which is discussed
below). If this relationship holds, it means that the considered ticket is winning;
he then records (u1, u2, µ, L), where u1 is the identity of the user he received the
associated packet from, and u2 is the identity of the user (or base station) he
forwarded it to. We let M denote the list of recorded reward triples.
Reward claim. If a user u is adjacent to a base station (i.e., the distance to the
base station is 1), then he transmits a claim (u,M,m) to the base station, where
m = MACKu(hash(M)). Thus, the reward claim M is authenticated using the
same key Ku as the user employs when originating a packet, or verifying whether
a packet contains a winning ticket.
Similarly, if user u originates a packet P or is running out of storage space for
claims, then he transmits the claim to the closest base station by means of the
packet origination protocol, and using the base station as the packet recipient.
The portion M may be encrypted using a stream cipher and using a secret key
shared by user u and either the base stations or the accounting center – in the
latter case, the MAC m would be computed on the ciphertext of M .
When a base station receives a claim, it veriﬁes the correctness of the MAC
m with respect to the user u and the claim M (or the ciphertext, as explained
above). If this is not correct, then he ignores the claim; otherwise, he records the
claim and computes an acknowledgement ack to it as ack = MACKu(m), where
Ku is the key he shares with the user (claimant) u. ack is transmitted to u, who
upon receipt veriﬁes the acknowledgement and erases M if correct. Within a
time ∆, each base station forwards all recorded claims to an accounting center,
and then erases the list.
8 Standard techniques can be used to determine in what cells packet recipients are
located. In particular, one may require users to announce their location to base
stations at regular intervals, or to announce changes of location – inferred by these
by the changing identity of the closest base station. While this “announcement” is
currently performed by direct communication from mobile device to base station,
our multi-hop technique can obviously be used instead. Users may piggyback reward
claims with such location announcements.
Ticket evaluations. As mentioned above, all tickets µ are evaluated with respect
to the secret9 key Ku of the user u in question, and with respect to some public
function f that results in a uniform distribution of winning tickets. One can
choose f as a one-way function, such as a hash function, and let a winning ticket
be one that hashes to a value with a certain pattern (e.g., any string that starts
with ten zeroes.) However, since the evaluation of f has to be performed once for
each packet the user u handles (except for those packets originating with u, of
course), it is important that f is lightweight, and preferrably more light-weight
than hash functions are.
A promising possibility is to let f(µ,Ku) = 1 iﬀ the Hamming distance
between µ and Ku is less than or equal to some threshold h. Thus, assuming
that |µ| = |Ku|, and given a particular reporting threshold h, the probability of









where  = |µ| = |Ku|. Note that it is possible to assign diﬀerent rewards to
diﬀerent Hamming weights in the range, making it possible for a user to keep
only the “highest rewards” in case he runs out of memory and needs to purge
some portion of the rewards. However, for simplicity, we assume that all reward
claims have the same value.
However, we note that if f is not a one-way function (as in the case above)
then it may be possible for an attacker to derive the user’s secret key Ku by
observing what tickets are ﬁled. Therefore, if such a function is used, it is im-
portant that all claims are encrypted during transmission, in which case only
the number of claims (as opposed to the form of these) would be revealed to an
attacker.
We note also that f must be chosen in a way that the distribution of winning
tickets is uniform.
On the probability of winning. The eﬃciency of our protocol relies on the proba-
bility of a ticket to win to be small enough for the claim process not to dominate
the protocol, whether in terms of storage or communication. At the same time,
we need the probability to be large enough that the reimbursement process relies
on a large number of claims, which in turn makes auditing possible by provid-
ing a suﬃciently large data set. Therefore, one needs to carefully balance these
problems against each other when selecting the appropriate reward function.
Rather than a security issue, this corresponds to a risk management issue and a
useability issue.
9 It is important that all of (or close to all of) Ku is needed to evaluate f successfully
– or users would be able to verify reward claims on behalf of each other, without
having to trust each other with their secret keys.
5 Accounting and Auditing
The accounting center receives both user claims and partial transmission tran-
scripts – both forwarded by base stations. These are processed as follows:
Accounting. The accounting center periodically veriﬁes all received user claims
with respect to all recorded reward tuples it has received from base stations. All
originators whose identity, uo, has been recorded by a base station are charged
a usage fee according to their service contract. Moreover, the accounting center
credits all parties10 whose identity ﬁgures (whether as a claimant or neighbor
thereof) in an accepted reward claim. It is a policy issue how to set the rewards
for neighbors to claimants, i.e., whether to let these depend on the reward level
of the packet as well, and how large a neighbor reward would be in comparison
to a claimant reward.
Here, a reward claim is said to be accepted if it is correct (i.e., if f(µ,Ku) = 1)
and a base station has reported the packet associated to the ticket µ as having
been transmitted. Note that the accounting center may credit claimants and
neighbors thereof according to any policy, and, in particular, the amounts may
diﬀer between claimants and neighbors; we do not dwell on these intricacies in
this extended abstract.
Simplified auditing. Assume for a moment that the probability of a ticket to
win is 1, and that all of these claims get reported by the users and passed on
to the auditing center. Assume further that all MAC headers are stored by the
base stations, and forwarded to the auditing center. We can now see that the
auditing center will know the origination point of each packet (from the identity
and MAC of the packet), and the identity of the base station receiving it. It will
also know the identity of the user transmitting it to the base station (since this
is recorded by the latter). From the claim of this user, it will know the identity
of the user one step earlier in the forwarding chain, and so on. This will take us
all the way back to the identity of the user who received the packet from the
originator, who in turn will report whom he received it from (i.e., the originator.)
If any user other than those already accounted for in the above claims a reward,
this will be identiﬁed as an attempt to cheating. The auditing process for the
probabilistic setting is analogous to the analysis of the simpliﬁed setting in that
it approximates the latter by means of statistical methods.
Auditing. In the following, we will assume that µ = 1, i.e., each base station
stores the MAC header of each packet. The more general case in which diﬀer-
ent base stations store diﬀerent fractions can be dealt with similarly: instead
of merely counting occurrences, one would then test various hypotheses using
standard statistical methods. It is worth noting that the probability of a ticket
being a winning ticket is a function of three quantities: the message; the secret
10 There are two exceptions to this rule: Neither packet originators nor base stations
obtain rewards.
key of the originator; and the secret key of the intermediary (i.e., the party ver-
ifying whether the ticket is winning.) Since the secret keys of users are selected
uniformly at random, the distribution of winning tickets is uniformly distributed
over all messages.
Common for many of the detection mechanisms is the observation that since
the probability for a ticket to win is independent of the identity of the user, each
user should ﬁgure as the claimant with approximately the same11 frequency as
he ﬁgures as either the sending neighbor or receiving neighbor of a claimant.
While one cannot simply compare the number of occurrences of these events,
one can check the hypothesis that they are all generated from a source with the
same event probability. As will become evident, many of the attacks we consider
leave very similar-looking evidence, which may make it diﬃcult to establish with
certainty what the attack was. However, one can easily establish the presence
of one of these attacks using standard statistical methods, and given suﬃcient
material.
– Selective acceptance. Selective acceptance is epitomized by a user ﬁgur-
ing as a claimant with a signiﬁcantly higher frequency than as a sending
neighbor.
– Packet dropping. A user is suspected of packet dropping if he has a higher
claimant frequency than sending neighbor frequency for packets that were
not reported as received by any base station.
– Ticket sniﬃng. A user is suspected of ticket sniﬃng if he has a higher
claimant frequency than sending neighbor or receiving neighbor frequency,
and there are incidents when both he and a neighbor ﬁles a claim for one and
the same ticket, but do not list each other as the corresponding neighbors.
If an entire fake path of reward claims has been created, the auditing center
can distinguish between this and a real path (with some probability) given
that the receiving base station will record the identity of the user from whom
the packet was received.
– Crediting a friend. An indication of this attack is that the receiving neigh-
bor of a given claim was reported by the base station to have been located
in a distant cell12 at the time the packet was received by the base station.
Another indication is if a ﬁrst user reports a second party to be the receiv-
ing neighbor, while another (also claiming a reward for the same packet)
claims to have received the packet from the ﬁrst party. While it is diﬃcult
to determine from one occurrence whether the ﬁrst or the third party ﬁled
an incorrect claim, repeated occurrences will allow this to be established.
11 We note that this is true independently of what the “collaboration thresholds” of
the diﬀerent parties on the route are. This is so since we consider the frequencies
along a path of senders where all have agreed to collaborate – their thresholds are
therefore irrelevant!
12 All cellular devices report to the closest base station when they move from one cell to
another. Similarly, when a device is turned on, it reports to the closest base station.
If a device is moved while turned oﬀ, we consider it to still remain in the cell where
it last was heard from.
– Greedy ticket collection. This has the same symptoms as the above men-
tioned attack. In addition, transmission paths – counted in number of claims
per packet – that are longer than usual (for the given cell) are indicative of
this attack. Similarly, abnormally high packet transmission rates per time
unit by some user indicates that greedy ticket collection has taken place.
Unusually large numbers of reward claims per time period therefore sug-
gests that this has taken place. (We note that the transmission rates must
be placed in the context of what type of hardware is used. The hardware
type is likely to be known by the service provider, so this does not cause any
problem.)
The greedy ticket collection attack is likely to be the hardest attack to detect;
especially if users scan for tickets of packets sent within the same cell as they
resided, and if the users take pains to make the reported neighbors consistent
with each other. However, should one party be found guilty of this attack,
this is likely evidence that its common neighbors are, too.
– Tampering with claims. This attack is prevented by use of authentication
techniques; the use of auditing tools does therefore not relate to the securing
against it.
– Reward level tampering. If claimants indicate higher reward thresholds
than that used for a given packet, this is an indication that the originator and
some colluder close to the base station may perform this attack. Repeated
evidence from diﬀerent claimants, all pointing towards one and the same
originator, provides strong evidence of the attack, in turn.
As for credit card fraud, use patterns can be employed to guard against
attacks; the above description is meant only as evidence that the collected audit
information is suﬃcient to detect and trace misbehavior. We are aware of further
techniques to do so, and believe that there are further techniques we are not
aware of. In fact, this problem is quite similar to intrusion detection, which has
been studied for most existing and envisioned networks, including mobile ad hoc
networks [26].
6 Conclusion
We have described an architecture for fostering collaboration between selﬁsh
nodes of multi-hop cellular networks, and have provided mechanisms to encour-
age honest behavior and to discourage dishonest behavior. To the best of our
knowledge, no single paper was published so far on this issue.
Our security model is not formal: Instead, we list a set of potential abuses
along with associated detection mechanisms. Thus, we propose to deal with
fraud in a similar manner to how telecommunications companies and credit card
companies do. A less heuristic approach would be a great step forward; however,
this is a diﬃcult task. Part of the reason for this is that not all packet forwarding
information gets reported to the auditor (as not all tickets are winning), and
that honest users may lose connectivity at any time. However, even if that were
not the case, a formal approach appears to be non-trivial. We hope that our
contribution can be a ﬁrst step in the direction of a formal treatment of the
problem.
In terms of future work, we intend to work on this formalization. In addition,
we will relax the assumption that all packets have to go through the backbone,
by combining the proposed solution with an approach related to pure ad hoc
networks, such as the one proposed in [4]. Moreover, we will explore the sym-
metric case of multi-hop cellular networks, and estimate the performance of the
proposed solution and propose appropriate optimizations whenever necessary.
Finally, we will consider session-based (as opposed to packet-based) solutions; a
result representing a ﬁrst step in that direction will appear shortly [2].
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